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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
TANNER AND EDGAR L.
VANCE for themselves and as a
ilass action on behalf of all persons
)imilarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellants
vs.
1NTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS
ASSOCIATION,
aka
UTAH
roULTRY AND FARMERS CO~PERATIVE, a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Respondent
~AY

Case No.

10306

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Alleged class and individual action against deiendant agricultural co-operative association. Eight
i~nglomerate "Causes of Action," all of which intorporate each other, variously pray for accounting
io de~nnine ownership interests, redetermination
and reallocation over the years of net profits or
'·margins," determination of the reasonableness of
~serves and requirement to issue "Certificates of
Interest" relating thereto, redetermination of
amounts due to producers who have ceased to profoce products, restraint from further distribution
u[ Certificates of Interest and patronage credits or
rooemption thereof, liquidation of the business and
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assets of the defendant co-operative, attorneys' f
and other relief. The relief sought would requ~::
fundamental reconstruction of past distribution
the accounting procedure, and basic changes in ths,
entire method of doing business going back ove~
the some forty-two years of defendant co-operative's
existence, and the two plaintiffs purport to represent
the interests of the thousands of defendant's patrons,
producers and members over that unlimited time
period.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The district court, after argument on special
setting for the third time, granted with prejudice
defendant's Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's designated
"Second Amended Complaint" on the several
grounds and in all particulars set forth in defendant's said Motion to Dismiss.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmance of the lower court's
order dismissing the "Second Amended Complaint"
with prejudice, both as to the individually named
plaintiffs and as to the "class" action aspect thereof.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is necessary to correct some misleading state·
ments set forth in Appellants' Brief, and to a~d
certain facts and matters from the Record. To begrn
with two additional items inadvertently omitted by
the Clerk of the lower court have been added a?d
certified to this Record. These are the original min·
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entry dated March 20, 1964, dismissing plainnffs' Complaint, (now R317) referred to as merely
an"alleged" minute entry (Appellants' Brief, p.17),
and the certified copy of Articles of Incorporation
and other corporate documents of the defendant Intermountain Farmers Association which was submitted to the trial court, (now R318-403).
Jte

1

The defendant company was organized in 1923

!

an agricultural co-operative association pursuant
to the Utah Statute (Utah Code Ann. 1953, 3-1-1
it seq). Over a decade ago, plaintiff Tanner did
~usiness with and patronized the defendant, then
mown as Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative. The
plaintiff Tanner presented a full range of grievances
~gainst the defendant in "an inordinantly protracted
:1fal" in 1962 which resulted in a judgment of dismissal on the merits, affirmed by this Court on
.1~peal (Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop.,
l~ U2d 145, 389 P2d 62 ( 1963)). The lower court's
findings and Conclusions in that case are included
rr1this Record (R46-59). Plaintiff Tanner now puriorts to sue personally and to represent others in a
ddass" action as to at least some of the matters and
thlngs adversely decided against him in the prior
litigation. Tanner hasn't done business with the
Mendant co-operative since 1955 (R255), and
~either the plaintiff Tanner nor the plaintiff Vance
~ve been "members" or "producers" or done busiiess with the co-operative since before the previous
1anner litigation in 1962 (R300).
as

The present action generally has to do with
~lleged property interests in the physical assets,
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Certificates of Interest or other patronage cred'l ·
and alleg~d "unrea~or:able" reserves of the defend~~i
co-operative associat10n. In the determination of
some of these matters, it is important to ascertain
whether persons claiming property interests are
qualified "members" of the Association. Membership
each year is based upon patronage, and such mem.
bershi p will vary from year to year depending upon
whether or not the required business or patronage
is maintained. ( R382-Article X). Thus, going back
to the inception of the co-operative in 1923, a dif.
ferent "class" of persons constitutes the membership
of the association each year. Particular rights and
benefits are granted to those who currently use the
Association's facilities (R382-Article XI and Article XIV). Property interests in the physical assets
or residue thereof upon dissolution are restricted to
"members" of the Association (R382-Article XIII
and Article XIV; cf R236, and see contrary assertion
with respect to this matter contained in Appellants'
Brief, pp. 2 and 3) ; patronage credits are issued to
both "members" and "patrons", but these are redeemable only upon a determination by the Board of
Directors of the Association that the company is in
a financial position to "revolve" or redeem such
patronage credits (R382-Article XI). Reasonable
reserves are permitted to be maintained (R382Article XII), and Mr. Tanner has already unsucces.s·
fully litigated the matter of a purported interest rn
such reserves by claiming that there had been. ac·
cumulated unreasonable reserves in the prior litiga·
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tion. This matter is considered in more detail under
the heading of Res Judicata.
, In the present litigation, plaintiffs Tanner and
I
I Vance have not and apparently cannot in repeated
attempts allege a legal interest or standing sufficient
Ito set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted.
\ 111 addition to failing to set forth a claim for relief,
I all three versions (plus two additional amendments)
of plaintiffs' Complaint failed to set forth "simple,
concise and direct" allegations, and have been vague,
indefinite and redundant in violation of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and directions of the Court
reimitting amendment to correct defects.
The original Complaint (Rl-9) was filed on
,January 29, 1964 with six persons as named plaintiffs. By "Amended Complaint" (RIO), one of the
rlaintiffs was deleted, and by "Notice of Dismissal"
three more of the original plaintiffs dismissed the
irtion as to themselves ( R12). Motions to Dismiss
IR20-22) and for More Definite Statement (R14rn) were argued before the court on March 20, 1964
IR151-152), and an order of dismissal was entered
as a minute entry by Judge Stewart M. Hanson as

I

follows:

"Defendants Motion to Dismiss granted and
the plaintiff is given to May 1, 1964 to amend
and it is suggested that in preparing the
amended complaint that plaintiff follow Motion for More Definite Statement." (R317)
An "Amended Complaint" was filed on May 18,
rn64 (R27-38). While this cured the fatally incon-
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sistent approach of the initial complaint which
combined a stockholders derivative action with a
class action, by abandonment of the stockholders
derivative aspect thereof, the allegations otherwise
were very similar to the allegations of the original
Complaint as well as the allegations carried through
into the subsequent "Second Amended Complaint."
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (R42-45) on
several grounds, including failure to set forth a legal
interest or standing to sue. Once more an alternative
Motion for More Definite Statement was filed (R6165) pointing out the substantial impossibility of
framing a responsive pleading to the indefinite allegations which had omitted reference to the nature
of any alleged interest in the plaintiffs, the time of
the existence thereof, and other essential matters.
These motions were again argued fully before Judge
Stewart M. Hanson who again entered an order of
dismissal (R76) and filed a Memorandum Decision
dated July 7, 1964 (R78). The Memorandum Deci·
sion stated in part:
"The matter was fully argued and ~ubn:itted,
and the Court now being fully advised. m ~he
premises finds that the motion to d1sm1ss,
pursuant to Ground 1 of said motion, sh~uld
be granted, and the plaintiffs given sue~ time
as they desire to amend, if they desire to
amend." (R78).
(Ground 1 of the Motion to Dismiss referred to in
the Memorandum Decision was for f a1·1ure to "spec·
ify any interest or grounds upon which the plaintiffs
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oreither of them has a legal interest or standing to
~ue the defendant in this action.") ( R42).
Argument concerning the failure of plaintiffs
to assert a legal standing or interest was not aimed
"primarily" at the failure to include matter in the
introductory paragraph within the body of the alle[ations of the Complaint, as is asserted in Appellants' Brief (p. 6). It was made very clear in argument that the objection was and is fundamental and
1nat nothing, even in the gratuitous opening para~raph, indicates the nature of any alleged interest
in the plaintiffs. (R196; cf R289). Contrary to the
aosolutely incorrect suggestion in Appellants' Brief
Ip. 7) that Judge Hanson's ruling (R78) precluded
further attack of the complaint by "similar prior
motions," Judge Hanson made it very clear in vacating plaintiffs' ex parte order which attempted to
mlarge upon his Memorandum Decision and ruling
(R79-80) that the ruling would speak for itself and
i·ould stand as originally written (R81, 82; cf R83,

!4).

The "Second Amended Complaint," which is the
wmplaint now before the Court, wasn't filed until
ieptember 1, 1964 (R87-99). This actually constituted the fourth change or amendment since the
original Complaint was filed January 29, 1964. Notrithstanding having taken the generous leave
iranted by the Court to amend in order to recast the
rleading so as to show, if possible, a sufficient legal
mterest or standing, the "Second Amended Com~laint" was a virtual verbatum copy of the previous
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defective "Amended Complaint." The only dist'
tion is that the introductory paragraph as previo
set forth in the Amended Complaint was si;?
repeated in the bo~y of the allegations of the Sectn~
Amended Complamt. (Compare R27 with R87, 88·
cf R213). Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint (Rlll-131), argued on a special setting basis ( R135, 136), was granted with
prejudice as to all grounds and particulars thereof
(R137, 138).

mr

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS.
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to motion authorized
under Rule 12 (b) ( 6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for "failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted," and in accordance with other
applicable Rules including Rules 8(a), 8(e), and
41 (b). Comments in Appellants' Brief relative to
demurrers under Rule 7 ( c) (Appellants' Brief p. 8),
raising affirmative defenses in pleadings under Rule
8(c) (Appellants' Brief p. 10), and capacity (not
interest or standing) to sue under Rule 9(a) (1)
(Appellants' Brief p. 10) are clearly inapplicable.
It is submitted that an affirmative plead,ing is not
required under the Rules in order to attack a com·
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ulaint on the ground of an insufficiency of interest
;,r standing to sue.

It should be noted that Defendant's Motion to
Jismiss the Second Amended Complaint was granted
"in all particulars" (Rl38). There were several
~·ounds for dismissal asserted in said motion, any
of which will support affirmance of the trial court's
action. In this connection, this Court stated in
Waters vs. Waters, 100 Utah 246, 248, 113 P2d 1038
(1941) :
"Neither the order of the court sustaining the
demurrer nor that of dismissal indicates upon
which of several grounds thereof the demurrer
was sustained. It, therefore, becomes necessary to examine the petition in the light of
both the general and special objections to its
sufficience, since the ruling of the lower court
will be upheld if it properly sustained the dernurrer on any of such grounds, the presumption being that it ruled upon that ground."
(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, this Court stated in Burningham v.
~urke et al, 67 Utah 90, 100, 245 P 977 (1926):
"Though the court erred in granting the motion (for nonsuit) on the particular ground
on which it was granted, still, if it ought to
have been granted on one or more of the other
grounds stated in the motion, the ruling
nevertheless must be upheld."
Another proposition of law of importance rela1ive to this matter is the oft recognized concept that
~ranting or refusing to grant permission to file
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repeated amendments is within the sound discret'
of the trial court. Accordingly, the decision of a ti~o~
judge with regard to such matters should not~
overturned unless there is shown an abuse of discre~
tion. Thus in Shall v. Henry, 211 F2d 226 (CA 7
1954), the court upheld a refusal to permit amend'.
ment after repeated unsuccessful attempts to state
a claim, and said:
"In view of the many amendments to the
complaint permitted by the court and the
voluminous pleadings filed as a result even
though the right to amend is to be con~trued
liberally, we think the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying ... application to amend
still further. There must be an end sometime
to applications to amend. Plaintiff had five
chances to state his case. Under the circum·
stances disclosed by the record, there was no
abuse of discretion in this respect." 211 F2d
at 231.
A. COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAIL URE TO SET FORTH
A LEGAL INTEREST OR STANDING
TO SUE
Rule 8 (a) requires that a claim be set fo:th
" ... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;
. . ." (Emphasis added). In the case before the
court, plaintiffs set forth three times "Causes ~f
Action" which did not allege any legal interest m
. of
themselves to sue the defendant. A close rea dmg
the Second Amended Complaint fails to show, whether in the introductory paragraph or in paragraph
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1of the alleged First Cause of Action, or elsewhere,
alegal interest or standing in the named plaintiffs

to sue. This is contrary to the fundamental proposition of law that where a property interest or ownership in the subject matter of the action is sought,
the pleader must set forth his alleged interest :
"Obviously where the right of the plaintiff to
recover depends on his ownership, title, possession, or right of possession of the subject
matter of the action, there must be in his
declaration or complaint a sufficiently full
and particular averment thereof . . .
.
"A plaintiff must allege the performance or
fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon
which his right of action depends, or show
sufficient legal excuse for failure or nonperformance, or a waiver thereof . . . " 41
Am Jur., Pleadings, Section 89, page 353.
(Emphasis added)
In the case of Heathman vs. Hatch, 13 U2d
i66, 268, 372 P2d 990 (1962), this court observed
that:
"The objective of these rules is to require that
the essential facts upon which redress is
sought be set forth with simplicity, brevity,
clarity and certainty so that it can be determined whether there exists a legal basis for
the relief claimed; and if so, so that there will
be a clearly defined foundation upon which
further proceedings by way of responsive
pleadings and/ or trial can go forward in an
orderly manner." (Emphasis added)
In State vs. California Packing Corporation
105 Utah 182, 141 P2d 386 ( 1943), this court re-
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jected as defective an amended complaint h' h
failed to show facts indicating a right to sue :w ic
"D~ such allegat~ons state a cause of action?
As is so ~ften said, to state a ca~se of actio~
a ~oI?pl~mt mus~ s~ow: A primary right
existing in the plaintiff; a primary duty with
regard thereto imposed by law on the defendant; a dehct ?Y. d~fen?ant in his duty with
respect to plamtiff s right ... The amended
complaint fails to show or plead any facts
sustaining a necessary infere nee to show that
plaintiff had a primary right to have the
waters of Mill Race Ditch unpolluted; it also
fails to show any duty owed by defendant to
plaintiff with respect to the waters of Mill
Race Ditch, or that defendant did anythingit
did not have a right to do." 105 Utah at 185,
189. (Emphasis added)
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that it is not abuse of discretion for the District
Court to dismiss a complaint with prejudice where
it appears that no amendment could cure the defect
in question. Accordingly, an order granting a Rule
12 (b) ( 6) motion with prejudice was upheld as within the trial court's discretion. Feinberg vs. Leach
243 F2d 64 ( CA5, 1957). In that case, the court
regarded as one of the evidences of the appar~nt
incurability of the complaint the fact that the plam·
tiff had attempted by three different complaints to
state a claim and failed.
A striking case of importance both as t? t~e
individual and class aspects of the present act10n '.s
Farmers Co-operative Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil

I
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Ico., 43 F Supp 735 (ND Iowa 1942), modified, 133
F2d 101 (CA 8, 1942), remanded, 51 F Supp 440

l (!943). In that case, the plaintiff co-operative asso-

ciation brought a class action alleging conspiracy
under the Clayton Act in the control of prices of
gasoline in a certain area. The alleged conspiracy
was asserted to have caused the plaintiff association
to raise the price of gasoline to its members by 214
cents per gallon. The trial court granted defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, holding that the case was not a
proper class suit and that the real parties in interest
~'ere the members of the co-operative and not the
co·operative itself. (43 F Supp 735). The Court of
Appeals affirmed that ruling, but held that the trial
court should have permitted the plaintiff to amend
and show any cause of action pertaining to itself as
acorporate entity. (133 F2d 101). Accordingly,
rlaintiff, on remand, amended its original Com11laint and claimed all of the damages to itself. The
trial court dismissed that complaint also, but granted
leave to file an amended pleading, which would set
forth specifically and factually its damages, as dis1 tlnguished from the damages of its members. Once
again plaintiff amended its complaint, whereupon
the trial court dismissed with prejudice. The court
said:

I

"I conclude that defendants' Motion to Dismiss is well taken upon either ground: First,
that the pleading does not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, because the
damage complained of is entirely conjectural
and impossible of proof ... Second, it was
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finally determined on the first appeal h
w0
were the real parties in interest .
"I conclude that the motion must be. ~ustain d
upon eac.h .of the gro~n~s interposed, and\
am of op1:i~on that plamtiff having had three
opportunities to state a cause of action and
failed, that leniency is now exhausted and
that the case should be dismissed and it is so
ordered." 51 F Supp at 442' (Emphasis
added).
It seems clear that the trial judges in the case
before the court regarded it as improbable that
future amendments could cure the defect for which
the complaints were dismissed. Thus, in the Memorandum Decision of Judge Hanson dismissing the
"Amended Complaint," unlimited time was granted
to plaintiffs to amend "if they desire to amend."
(R78) The fatal nature of the defect was repeatedly
argued in court, and it was stipulated by counsel for
plaintiffs that the parties before the court claim no
present membership interest as producers or current
patronage interest in the defendant co-operative
( R300). It was also candidly noted that the action
itself was not "particularly" brought on behalf of
the named plaintiffs but rather for the class (R227;
cf R244). Under the state of facts in this Record,
it was not error to dismiss the "Second Amended
Complaint" with prejudice, since after several at·
tempts to amend it still failed to state a claim show·
ing that plaintiffs were entitled to relief as required
by Rule 8 (a).
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B. COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH OTHER UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND PRIOR ORDERS OF
COURT
Rule 41 (b) provides:
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of

an action or of any claim against him . . .
Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided
for in this rule, other than a dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
(Emphasis added.)
Among other grounds, the Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (see R112,
113) attacked that pleading under Rule 41 (b) for
failure to comply with certain Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as well as the court's directive that subsequent amendments should follow requirements set
forth in Defendant's Motion for More Definite Statement.
1. Failure to Comply with Court Order.
Judge Hanson entered the following order in
uismissing plaintiffs' "original" (although twice
amended) complaint:
"Defendants Motion to Dismiss granted and
the plaintiff is given to May 1, 1964 to amend
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and it is suggested that in preparing th
amended complaint that plaintiff follow Me
tion for More Definite Statement." (R317)°"
A striking case similar in many respects to the
facts of this case is Blake v. De Vilbiss Co., 118 F2d
3~6 (CA6, 1941_). That case was an action forinju.
r1es caused by diseases resulting from an employer's
negligence. Some seventeen respiratory diseases and
seven or eight organic diseases were claimed to have
been inflicted upon the plaintiff for failure to fur.
nish pure air to breathe and other negligent omissions. The trial court regarded the petition in
question as "not sufficiently definite or certain to
apprise the defendant of the basis for the relief
claimed or to permit a recovery," but permitted
amendment on condition that such should avoid
"prolixity and surplusage" and should state precisely
the claims and grounds of negligence upon which
recovery was relied. Amendments were made in due
course but these were "equally prolix and indefinite
not only in respect to specific diseases suffered and
the acts of negligence complained of but also to the
time or place of their commission and their approximate relations to the injury." A subsequent amendment was subject to the same infirmities. A motion
interposed under Rule 41 (b) was granted an~ the
complaint was dismissed with prejudice for fa.1l~re
to comply with the order of the court re9umng
definite and certain allegations, as well as fa1lur~ t.0
conform with Rule 8 ( e) of the Federal Rules of .civil
Procedure. The appellate court affirmed the JUdg·
men t of dismissal.
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That a court has inherent power to order
dismissal of an action with prejudice where amendments fail to comply with the court's rules of proceedings and/ or orders is clearly affirmed in Feight
v. Mathers et al., 153 Nebraska 839, 46 NW 2d 492.
(1951). The rule is summarized in an annotation in
American Law Reports:

"It is obvious that the power and authority
of a trial court to compel obedience to orders
relating to the plaintiff's pleadings is necessary to attain orderly and prompt disposition
of pretrial proceedings. Recognizing this fact,
the courts in ju:cisdictions adopting or allowing dismissal of a plaintiff's action as a proper
punishment or coercive measure have uniformly held or recognized that an action, in
the discretion of the trial court, may be dismissed because of the disobedience of an order
relating to pleadings filed, or to be filed, by
the plaintiff." 4 ALR 2d 348, 352. (Emphasis
added).
The direction of the court to the plaintiffs in
DeVilbiss to define their claims and grounds, thereby
avoiding prolixity and surplusage, was, in effect, the
same direction and suggestion made to plaintiffs in
this case by Judge Hanson in his order of March 20,
, 1964 (R317). Judge Hanson's order required Plaintiffs to follow the Motion for More Definite Statement, which motion pointed out in specificity the
matters and things essential in order to enable defendant to frame a responsive pleading. (R14-19; cf
R61-65 and Rl00-104). Counsel for Appellant regards Judge Hanson's directive as "no more than a

1

I
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suggestion" which "does not constitute an ord ,,

(Appellants' Brief p. 17), but that kind of "sug er
. " .
. 1 h
ges.
t ion
is precise y t e sort of order which is comm
with reference to attempts to refile in conformi~n
with Rule 8. Thus, in Walter Reade's Theaters
Loew's Inc., 20 FRD 579 (SDNY, 1957), the follow~
ing "suggestion" was made:

I

J'

"Accordingly, the complaint is stricken with
leave to plaintiff within 20 days to file an
amended pleading which contains simple
concise, and distinct averments in conformity
with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The amended complaint should avoid
the infirmities of the present complaint herein
referred to." (20 FRD at 582).
It seems clear that the foregoing "suggestion''
amounted to an "order," which if not followed would
be subject to attack under Rule 41 (b). The directive
or "suggestion" in De Vilbiss was certainly so regarded, and properly so. Judge Hanson's "suggestion" should also be so regarded.

2. Failure to Show Cause for Repeated Ament
ments-Rule 15 (a)
Rule 15 (a) provides in part that:
"A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time befo~e a respon:
sive pleading is served ... Otherwise, a party
may amend his pleading only by leave of cou:'.
Or by written consent Of the adverse rart,J I
and leave shall be freely given when 1ustice
so requires." (Emphasis added.)
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Cases construing Rule 15 (a) where leave to file
repeated amendments is sought are pertinent to this
situation. Rulings in this regard are entirely discre' tionary, the public policy and reasoning behind refusal to grant such amendments generally being
that there must be an end to litigation at some point.
See Shall v. Henry, 211 F2d 226 (CA7, 1954).
A case which stands for the proposition that

repeated amendments will not be allowed in order
to state a cause of action when previous complaints
have failed on that very ground is Laughlin v. Garnett, 138 F2d 931 ( CADC, 1943) cert den 322 US
738. That case was an action for malicious prosecution against two United States Attorneys and a
police officer wherein practically all of the activities
described in the complaint were part of the official
duties of those officers. The trial court refused to
permit plaintiff to file a third amended complaint
in which knowledge of instigation of false charges
was alleged, as was knowing preparation and presentation of forged documents to a grand jury in order
to obtain false indictments. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia upheld the trial court's
discretion in refusing further amendment, and said:
"Under Rule 15(a), of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, after responsive pleadings
have been filed a party may amend only by
written consent of the adverse party or by
leave of court when justice so requires. Since
the complaint before us is the fourth unsuccessful attempt of appellant to set out a cause
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of action against appellees, we believe that th
court properly denied further amendment'~
138 F2d at 932 (Emphasis added).
·

It is well established that granting or denying
proferred amendments is within the sound discretion
of the trial court. Thus, refusal to grant leave to
amend is not ground for reversal except for abuse
of discretion. (Frank Adam Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co., 146 F2d 165 ( CA8, 1945).
The inquiry in reviewing the trial court's action in
such cases is confined to circumstances which clearly
show an abuse of discretion, in the nature of arbitrary action. (Hartford-Empire v. Obear-Nester
Glass Co. 95 F2d 414 (CA8, 1938). See also N.L.R.B.
v. Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Co-op, Inc., 285 F2d
8, 11 ( CA6, 1960) and Kirsch v. Barnes, 157 F Supp
671 (DC 1957) aff'd 263 F2d 692 (CA9, 1959). Itis
said that a court's ruling on whether or not to grant
amendments after the first will be disturbed only
upon gross abuse of its power. Heay v. Phillips, 201
F2d 220, (CA9, 1952).

Some considerations which may justify refusal
to permit amendment were discussed at length in
Friedman et al v. Trans-American Corporation, 5
FRD 115 (DADel, 1946). In that case the court was
confronted with a proferred amendment for the
fourth time several months after the original complaint was' filed, which amendment contained no
essentially "new" matter. The motion to amend was
denied, and the court said :
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"Rule 15 (a) provides that leave to amend
shall be freely given when justice so requires.
The word "freely" was used with deliberate
intention to obviate technical restrictions on
amendment. Moore, Federal Practice, p. 806.
But, this does not mean that leave to amend
is to be granted without limit; otherwise, the
right to amend would be absolute and not rest
in the discretion of the court. The interests of
both parties should be considered when an application to amend is made. Opportunity
should be given to a plaintiff to present his
alleged grievance; yet equal attention should
be given to the proposition that there must be
an end finally to a particular litigation ...
In short, the matter of giving leave to amend
is one in the sound discretion of the nisi prius
court. I agree with Judge Rifkind that "Rule
15 (a) prescribes a liberal policy in granting
leave to amend." But "a liberal policy" does
not mean the absence of all restraint. Were
that the intention, leave of court woilld not be
required. The requirement of judicial approval suggests that there are instances where
leave should not be granted. Here, I believe
we have such an instance. This is plaintiffs'
fourth attempt to state their cause of action
and their third request to amend, more than
sixteen months after the complaint was filed."
(5 FRD at 116. Emphasis added).
3. Failure to File Clear and Comprehensible
Pleading-Rule 8 ( e)
Rule 8 ( e) requires. that averments in pleadings

be "simple, concise, and direct." In the De Vilbiss
case, supra, the court made specific reference to

uq
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the fact that the defective pleading, which was fin 1ly dismissed with prejudice, "does not conform ~o
Rule 8 ~ e ). ( 1) of the federal rules." ( 118 F2d at
347). S1m1larly, the court observed in Strahle-Johnson Supply Co., 1 FRD 279 (ED Tenn, 1940) that
"The letter and spirit of the Rules of Civil Procedure
requires simple, concise, and direct denials, admissions, and averments in pleadings." (Portion of
answer stricken on trial court's own initiative.) It
is clear that the determination of whether there has
been reasonable compliance with the rules, including
Rule 8 ( e), must rest with the trial court's discretion.
Carrigan v. California State Legislature, 263 F2d
560 ( CA9, 1959), cert den 359 U.S. 980.
In the case at bar, the pleadings on file are anything but "simple, concise and direct." They are
actually a conglomerate of averments, unlimited in
scope as to time, persons or otherwise. They are imprecise as to the nature of any alleged injury. A good
example is the introductory paragraph of both the
"amended" and "second amended" complaints, the
inclusion of which into affirmative allegations appellants rely upon as setting forth an adequately
pleaded interest. Actually, however, the long and involved sentence structure is never completed into a
full English sentence. (See R87, 88.) Similarly,
"various years" and "times material" are referred
to, but no actual reference of a concise nature appears so as to enable a responsive pleading by way of
affirmative defense or otherwise. As a result of the
gross violations of Rule 8(e) and Rule 12(c), relat.
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ing to immaterial and redundant matter, motions to
strike (R23, 24; R66-68; R105-110) were filed setting forth in particularity the complained of defects
under Rule 8 ( e). These were companion motions to
the Motions to Dismiss and For More Definite Statement, and while not granted directly, contain in some
detail the specification of defects pertinent to Rule
S(e), the violation of which was one of the grounds
for granting the Motion to Dismiss.
C. THE COMPLAINT WAS RES JUDICATA
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF TANNER,
AND THEREFORE WAS PROPERLY
DISMISSED AS TO HIM.
Despite counsel for Appellants' claim that this
question is not properly before the court (Appellant's
Brief p. 16) it is submitted that having attached the
Findings and Conclusions to the Motion to Dismiss
(R117-130) such became properly before the court in
the nature of an affidavit or information in support
of the motion. While Rule 8 ( c) permits raising the
defense of res judicata in pleadings, it certainly
doesn't preclude raising the defense by a Rule 12 (b)
(6) Motion. In any event, this is a matter as to which
the court can take judicial notice since it involves the
Supreme Court of Utah's own decision in a case previously before it, embracing Findings and Conclusions referred to therein.
It is submitted that the entire Complaint as to
the plaintiff Tanner should in any event be dismissed
as res judicata. The Third Cause of Action in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint most clearly comes
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within the d~ctri:ie~ however. To the extent that that
cause of act10n is mcorporated in the other caus
of action, they would very clearly also be res ju;i~
cata. The Third Cause of Action has to do with an
alleged property interest of the plaintiffs in an accumulation of unreasonable reserves. The fact of the
matter, however, is that Ray Tanner had fully presented this matter in the previous litigation and the
court found that no reserves had been established
which were unreasonable. Accordingly, that aspect
of the Complaint of Mr. Tanner in the previous litigation was dismissed with prejudice. See Finding No.
6 (R121) and Conclusion No. 1 (R129) and No. 3
(R130). This is important not only in regard to the
propriety of a personal action as to such matters by
Mr. Tanner, but also with respect to his representative capacity or lack of it in connection with the
class aspect of the litigation.
It is clear also in the previous litigation that the
trial court ruled that the interest and standing of the
plaintiff Tanner was such that he was guilty of
laches, and the causes of action asserted were barred
by the statute of limitations, and other defenses.
(R129).
The doctrine of res judicata is broad enough to
embrace all matters which were expressly litigated
as well as matters and things which could have been
raised and adjudicated. Thus in East Mill Creek
Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 321, ~22,
159 P2d 863 ( 1945) this court pointed out that if .a
second case is between the same parties or their
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privies, and the claim, demand or cause of action is
the same in both cases, the doctrine of res judicata
"applies not only to points and issues which are actually raised and decided therein but also to such as
could have been therein adjudicated . .. In such case
the courts hold that the parties should litigate their
entire claim, demand and cause of action, and every
part, issue and ground thereof, and if one of the
parties fails to raise any point or issue or to litigate
any part of his claim, demand or cause of action and
the matter goes to final judgment, such party. may
not again litigate that claim, demand or cause of action or any issue, point or part thereof which he could
have but failed to litigate in the former action."
(Emphasis added) .
Again, in Wheadon v. Pearson 14 U2d 45, 47,
376 P2d 946 (1962), this Court said:
"Policy would seem to indicate that when a
plaintiff has once attempted to obtain his entire relief, based upon his entire claim, then
the matter should be laid at rest. He should be
denied a second attempt at substantially the
same objective under a different guise." (Emphasis added)
(See also Stillinovich v. Ottilia Villa, Inc., 14 U2d
222, 381 P2d 210 (1963).)
Appellants insist that the issue of res judicata
can be raised only in a pleading under Rule 8 ( c).
This position is contrary to what appears to be the
weight of authority and the better reasoned cases.
Professor Moore has summarized the rule :

26

"It should n~w ?e clear, however, that the defense of res JUd1cata can be ... raised by mo
t~on to dismiss for failure to state a clai~
smce the court may treat such a motion as a
motion for summary judgment." lB Moore's
Federal Practice 951, 952. Accord Hartmann
v. Time, 166 F2d 127, 138 (CA3, i947).
In Florasynth Laboratories, Inc. v. Goldberg, 191
F2d 877 (CA 7, 1951), the court upheld a judgment
of res judicata based upon a Rule 12(b) (6) motion
in which prior court findings and conclusions were
referred to.
Counsel for appellants assert that no claim of
plaintiff Tanner is res judicata, but concede that the
issue could well apply to the reasonableness of reserves (Third Ca use of Action) , if such were properly raised in an affirmative pleading. (Appellant's
Brief p. 16). At the same time, comfort is taken in
the assertion that the question of reallocation of
"margins" wasn't expressly presented in the prior
litigation. It is submitted that based upon the previous ruling in which plaintiff 'Tanner was held to
have no valid claim of any kind against the defendant
co-operative, all of his claims being dismissed with
prejudice (Rl30), coupled with the doctrine that
any other claims he conceivably could assert should
then have been raised and litigated, the entire action
should be dismissed with prejudice in any event
against the plaintiff Tanner.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED AS TO THE CLASS ACTION
It is fundamental that the "class" aspect of the

present action must fall if the individual action
fails. The reason for this, of course, is that if the individual plaintiffs do not possess rights or interests
sufficient to maintain this action for themselves,
they most certainly do not possess additional rights
by some magic in order to maintain a "class" suit.
Thus, in Pacific Inter-Club Yacht Assn. vs. Morris,
197 FSupp 218 (ND Calif, 1960), 288 F2d 886 (CA
9, 1961), it was held that where no individual would
have standing to enjoin the creation of a bridge without a showing of special damage to himself, the mere
fact that the suit was brought under Rule 23 in the
name of 9,000 individuals who might seek to use the
waterway over which the bridge was to be built could
not create greater rights in the group than a single
individual would have.
In the case at bar, it appears that plaintiffs hope
to "pull themselves up by their boot straps" and
bolster their faltering individual interest and standing by asserting through counsel that the action was
not "particularly" brought for those plaintiffs, but
rather for the "class" ( R 227). This appears to be
aspurious argument.

A. No Common "Class" is Defined or Delineated.
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Rule 23 (a) permits a representative action 0
behalf of " ... persons constituting a class . ... '' n
The immediate problem is, what persons consti.
tute the "class" which plaintiffs claim to represent?
As pointed out in the recitation of facts herein the
Articles of Incorporation of the defendant co-o~era.
tive association contemplate that membership in the
association shall be based upon patronage with the
association each year, and such membership varies
from year to year depending upon whether or not a
minimum amount of business or patronage is maintained (currently $500.00 per annum. See R 382Article X). In fact, there is a different "class" of
persons having an interest in the "margins", reserves, and other assets of the association from year
to year, depending upon patronage. It is also a fact
that the defendant co-operative association has been
divided into distinct and separate departments, each
of which constitutes a separate "class" of persons.
These departments serve both purchasing (Farm
Supply, Feed Sales and Processing, and Fertilizer
Sales) and marketing (Egg Processing and Sales,
Poultry and Turkey Processing) functions of the
co-operative. Since in any year a profit may be
realized in one or more of the departments, while a
loss may be sustained in other departments, ~he
patrons of the "profit" departments may have mterests adverse to or inconsistent with the patrons of
"loss" departments in the matter of allocation of the
net "margins". Plaintiffs demand a re-allocation. of
past patronage refunds based upon an interpretatrnn
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which would in effect lump the "profit" departments
1dth the "loss" departments, thereby spreading the
''margins" without reference to the departmentalized source of the creation of such "margins". (R
273). This is incompatible with the manner and
method of accounting and allocation carried on by
the association in the past, and would unquestionably prejudice the many members and patrons to
whom have been allocated certificates of interest and
other patronage credits on a departmentalization
basis.
The complaint in this action fails to identify or
describe a common "class" of persons purportedly
represented herein, except by lumping the "tens of
thousands" (R 287) of patrons and members since
inception of the co-operative as the "only one class"
who own some sort of "undivided interest" in the
"mass of assets" over the years. (Appellants' Brief
p.14; cf pp. 4, 5). In seeking to require a re-allocation of past patronage refunds, plaintiffs herein
lump together all members and patrons without reference to source of business and patronage, which
has the effect of putting into one conglomerate mass
incompatible and antagonistic interests. As a result,
there is nowhere set forth a "class" within the meaning of Rule 23.
The assertion of the existence of a "class"
doesn't create one:
"By definition, an essential prerequisite to a
class action is the existence of a "class" . .. An
action, of course, is not a class suit merely be-
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cause it is designated as such in the pleadin .
~hether it is or is not depends upon the atte~~
~nr; /a~ts. But the compl~int, or other pleadin
1n1.tiating the class act10n, should allege th~
existence of the necessary facts, i.e., the exU!tence of a class, .. . " 3 Moore's Federal Practice

3423, 3424. (Emphasis added.)
It is well established that the interests of persons purportedly representing a "class" must be
compatible with and not antagonistic to the interests
of the "class" represented (Hansberry vs. Lee, 311
U.S. 32 ( 1940) ) . A fortiori, where a conglomerate
of several categories of persons, some categories of
which have interests not wholly compatible with or
antagonistic to the interests of the others, are lumped
together.
B. Plaintiffs Do Not Belong to the "Class".
Rule 23, in authorizing class suits, permits the
action to be brought only by "such of them", referring to "persons constituting a class." Plaintiffs
must belong to the "class" they claim to represent,
and their interest and right as such members of the
class must be pleaded. See Clark vs. Chase National
Bank, 45 FSupp 820 (SDNY, 1942) and Ricky vs.
Illinois Central R. R., 278 F2d 529 (CA 7, 1960).
This Court has recognized that Rule 23 requires the
persons who are suing on behalf of the class to belong
to the class. Thus, in Salt Lake City vs. Utah Lake
Farmers Association, 4 U2d 14, 25, 286 P2d 773
(1955), Justice Wade observed that "Rule 23 only
authorizes the defendants to represent a class of per·
sons to which they belong . ... "Professor Moore cites
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many authorities for the proposition that" ... the interest of the named representative ... must be coextensive with the interest of the other members of
the class." 3 Moore's Federal Procedure 3427.
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs are not current
''members" of the defendant co-operative association, and neither have belonged or done business with
the association since before 1962 (R 300). (In the
case of Plaintiff Tanner, not since 1955 (R 255).
These plaintiffs do not have a co-extensiveness of
interest with current members and patrons. Also
their interest cannot be the same as the class of persons who allegedly benefited from the past allocations
or patronage refunds. (See paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. R 91.) It is clear
that plaintiffs seek to recalculate past allocations,
without regard to source of patronage by departments ( R. 273). Their interests would certainly be
incompatible and not co-extensive with the interests
of the persons to whom patronage refunds have been
allocated, and from whom plaintiffs would apparently seek to take such allocations away.
,
It is submitted that the plaintiffs have an an• tagonistic interest with many past patrons and mem, bers and could not belong to the same "class". By
, reason of that fact alone, this action cannot be main: tained by these plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of the
United States has set forth the guidelines thusly:
1

I
I

"It is one thing to say that some members of a
class may represent other members in a litigation where the sole and common interest of the
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class ii: the litigation, is either to assert a com
n:on rig~~ or to challenge an asserted obli · ·
bon. ( C1tmg cases). It is quite another t hgf.
t~at all those ;vho are free alterna~iv~ld
either. to assert rights or to challenge them ai·~
of a s1!1gie class, so that any group merely be.
cause it is of the class so constituted may b
deemed a?eq?~telJ: to rep:e~ent any ~thers 0 ~
the class m htigatmg their mterests in eithe·
alternative. Such a selection of representative~
for the purpose of litigation, whose substantfol
interests are not necessarily or even probably
the same as those whom they are deerned
to represent, does not afford that protection to
absent parties which due process required."
Hansberry vs. Lee, 311 U.S. at 44, 45. (Emphasis added.)

C. Plaintiffs Do Not Adequately Represent
Any "Class".
Rule 23 permits class actions to be brought only
by such persons who constitute the class "... as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all. ..."
This matter was extensively dealt with in Salt Lake
City vs. Utah Lake Farmers Association, 4 U2d 14,
286 P2d 773 ( 1955). In that case, this Court observed
the distinctions under the rule between "true", "hybrid" and "spurious" class actions, and it was observed that as to each type of action the rule requires
joinder of such persons as ". . . will fairly insme
adequate representation of all members of the class."
The considerations and factors with reference to a
determination of adequacy of representation are discussed by Professor Moore as follows:
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"In determining the question the court must
consider ( 1) whether the interest of the named
party is co-extensive with the interests of the
other members of the class; (2) whether his
interests are antagonistic in any way to the interests of those whom he represents; ( 3) the
?Jroportion of those made parties as compared
with the total membership of the class; ( 4)
any other factors bearing on the ability of the
named party to speak for the rest of the class;
and ( 5) the type of class action involvedwhether true, hybrid, or spurious." 3 Moore's
Federal Practice 3425. (Emphasis added.)
It seems clear that under any of the factors
' above refc1Ted to in judging adequacy of representation that the plaintiffs in this case fall far short of
the mark. The1·e is serious problem with regard to
co.extensiveness of interest, since neither of the
plaintiffs are current patrons or members and appear to claim rights different from those of patrons
of some of the co-operative's departments; there is
probable antagonism bet\veen the interests of these
plaintiffs and the interests of many of the other profocers they have conglomerated into the "class"; the
proportion of representation based upon the "tens of
1housands" of persons (R287) plaintiffs purport to
i'epresent would be de minimus. There are other
serious factors adversely bearing upon the "ability of
the named plaintiffs to speak for the rest of the
. class'', particularly the res judicata matter relating
I to the Plaintiff Tanner.
I An additional very serious matter bearing upon
tlli; propriety of representation here is the type of

I
I

I
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class action involved. Counsel for appellants rega d
this suit as in the nature of a "true" or "hyb;d;;
class action, and extensively so argued it (R228·
R277). If this action is of the "true" variety it
would be absolutely binding upon all persons within
the class and hence adequate representation would be
extremely important:
"The question of adequate representation is
very important in the true class suit, for there
as we shall see, a judgment on the merits bind~
all the members of the class and adequate
representation is essential to due process of
law." 3 Moore's Federal Practice 3425.
While the "hybrid" suit is not technically binding upon all class members, adequacy of representation is nevertheless an important issue:
" ... a court has a duty to see that its processes
are not abused, that the action is not a mere
collection device to promote the plaintiff's individual interests, ... To this extent the court
may properly scrutinize the plaintiff's claim
of representation." 3 Moore's Federal Practice
3426.
The "spurious" class action is really a mere permissive joinder device, no one being bound except the
original plaintiffs and interveners. The matter of
basic propriety and desirableness of such joinde.r, ~s
is the case in all "class" actions, is of course within
the sound discretion of the trial court. This Court
has clearly pointed out the reasons why individual
damage claims, and other claims of an individual na·
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ture, are inappropriate for disposition under the
''spurious" class action :
"The individual damage claims of the members of this class are several and not common
claims as are their claims for violation of their
rights and for injunctive relief previously considered. They are spurious not true representation claims and come under subdivision
(a) (3) and not (a) (1), of Rule 23 ... Such
individual damage claims cannot be litigated
by representation, they can only be litigated if
the claimant is or becomes a party to this
action, for such claims are dependent on individual factors not common to all members of
the class and the defendants simply do not represent the other members of the class as to
such individual claims." Salt Lake City vs.
Utah Lake Farmers, 4 U2d at 25, 26. (Emphasis added.)
.
It is difficult to assign the designation of "true",
! "hybrid" or "spurious" to the kind of "class" action
presented herein. It is believed that this action is

fundamentally not a class action at all, and so the
; problem of designation of the variety of such action
is not reached. However, it is submitted that by any
; of the designations that might be assigned to this
: action as a "class" action its maintenance would be
, inappropriate on the ground of inadequacy of repre, sentation. It should be remembered that this action
was commenced with several plaintiffs (Rl-9). By
"Amended Complaint" (RIO) one of the plaintiffs
' was deleted, and subsequently by "Notice of Dis! missal" ( Rl2) three more of the plaintiffs were
1
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dismissed out of the action. This has left only plain.
tiffs Tanner and Vance purporting to represent t}1
"
.e
tens of thousands" (R287) of the patrons who have
an alleged interest in this lawsuit. It seems clear
that these plaintiffs do not adequately represent any
"class".
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the trial court's judgment
of dismissal with prejudice should be affirmed both
as to the individual plaintiffs and with regard to the
so-called "class" aspect of the complaint.

With regard to the individual plaintiffs, it is
significant that in the three separate versions of
complaints (plus two other amendments) no legal interest or standing to sue was ever directly asserted
as to the plaintiffs. Certainly in the some ten months
from the filing of the original complaint to final dismissal of the "Second Amended Complaint" there
was sufficient time and ample opportunity to set
forth the nature of any such interest. There was failure to comply with the court's directive to be more
specific in defining the nature of the claims and interests of the plaintiffs. In addition, the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure were not followed in other particulars in that the complaints were not simple,
direct, and concise, there was not shown any proper
cause so as to justify repeated leave for amendments,
and the amendments when filed failed to specify in
a clear and comprehensible way the nature of any
interest of the plaintiffs, the time period involved,
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and other material essential to phrase a responsive
rleading. In addition, the complaints were res judicata as to the Plaintiff Tanner.
With regard to the class action aspect of the
complaints, it is submitted that such was properly
a!smissed for several reasons. To begin with, a common class of persons with co-extensive interests was
never adequately or properly defined. In addition, it
affirmatively appears in the Record that plaintiffs
, aonot currently belong to any defined class, and as to
i the conglomerate "class" insisted upon, their claims ·
and interests are in fact antagonistic to other persons within the same "class". In any event, the plain. tiffs do not adequately represent any class of persons,
1 whether such be denominated as "true", "hybrid" or
I ''spurious".
It is submitted that the judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,

J. Thomas Greene
of Marr, Wilkins & Cannon
920 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent

